EtherFi Borrowing (Optimism)

Debt and rates count loans made in US dollars and dollar stablecoins. Loans in euros, francs, yen, ether or bitcoin itself are separate books, shown by currency on each venue, never added in.

Price

What does credit cost here, and how is the price formed?

Quality

What stands behind a position, and what can change under the reader?

Composition

Who and what makes up this market?

What the loans are denominated in

Not yet established for this venue — which is not the same as dollars.

Backing chain

backing_chain (v1 §9.5, D29): the ordered claims standing between a creditor and the coins, each link derived from a sourced fact already held and carrying it in `derived_from` — the custody cell, the venue's borrow card, or wrapper_registry.yaml for who holds the bitcoin behind a token. A `representation` link has one branch per token the venue takes; branches are alternatives, not a sequence. A link nobody has established is shown with status `incomplete` and names what is missing — it is never dropped, because a missing link omitted makes a long chain look short. `undisclosed` means the party does not publish it; `incomplete` means this dataset has not established it. NEVER SCORED AND NEVER COUNTED: no length, link count or ranking is published, and none should be derived — chain length and link transparency are orthogonal (ETP-backed margin is the longest chain here and every link of it is regulated). `recourse` is what the creditor holds beyond the chain. ⚠ Tokens are identified BY SYMBOL: the wrapper registry is not keyed by chain or address, so every `representation` link carries a `deployment` step that is incomplete — whether a token is native to the chain of the venue or a bridge receipt (one more link) is not established — and a symbol the registry knows to name a different token on a venue is shown unresolved, not given that wrapper's holders.

1. contract_escrow established — the protocol contract — the collateral is escrowed and neither the operator nor the borrower can move it
   source

   attribute · custody_model = protocol_custodial

   ether.fi CASH_HUB 0x66753c4e3fC84f1eD0e3C267C927284E9d90C572 on Optimism (chain 10), read 2026-10-06 block 157847186: collateral supplied through the Spoke is held by the Hub — the Hub's token balance equals getAssetLiquidity() for every asset (e.g. eBTC 15.58407261, weETH 3,489.93, liquidBTC 102.18). Hub and Spoke are proxies (implementations 0x697aF342…, 0xA1f75D80…); both proxy admins (0xed57ae702efc1774a131689e9d9b876e4063f6f5, 0xac44bde208560611e8c865ee721dc9ccb54a0596) are owned by 0xbaCa0cD6B69Eef3257e2D122b22ddEE8AeE5e283, a timelock with getMinDelay() = 86400 s (24 h); who may propose to it was not read. Roles sit on AccessManager 0x188d7173772499FB6375F23FdFd130CE6107286b (authority() of Hub and Spoke). Non-borrowable collateral (eBTC, weETH, liquidBTC: borrowable = false) is not lent on; ⚠ USDC/USDT/WETH posted as collateral sit in the same pooled asset that is lent out. Borrowers are ether.fi Cash card accounts only: an EtherFiSafe (smart-contract account) created by the EtherFiSafeFactory 0xF4e147Db314947fC1275a8CbB6Cde48c510cd8CF, whose deployEtherFiSafe() requires ETHERFI_SAFE_FACTORY_ADMIN_ROLE (published source), so ether.fi decides who gets an account. Two sampled Safes on Optimism (0xcA5582086c2759F5014ef069F2539F54063501D0, 0x7A70F3d69c09AE1D38FCeC60e8E048282139ee5a, factory index 545000-545001, read 2026-10-06 block 157847421): one user owner, threshold 1; recovery enabled, recovery threshold 2, recovery signers = the ether.fi Safe 0xA6cf33124cb342D1c604cAC87986B965F428AAC4 (3 of 6) and a third-party signer 0x4F5eB42edEce3285B97245f56b64598191b5A58E; EtherFiDataProvider.getRecoveryDelayPeriod() = 259200 s (72 h). ⚠ So ether.fi and the third party together can replace the Safe's owner after 72 h without the user (published RecoveryManager source: a recovery sets an incoming owner after the delay). The user can override the default recovery signers (setter in source); how many have done so is unknown. ether.fi's wallet role also debits the Safe for card spends (CashModule.spend, onlyEtherFiWallet) within the user's limits. ⚠ The LendGateway (an ether.fi-upgradeable module) can supply, withdraw, borrow and repay on the Safe's behalf without a per-op user signature; exits from the position land in the Safe behind the Cash withdrawal delay (CashModule.getDelays() = 10, 10, 10 seconds, read). ⚠ This venue also holds the LEGACY engine until its positions finish migrating (operator, 2026-10-06: one venue over both): ether.fi DebtManager 0x0078C5a459132e279056B2371fE8A8eC973A9553 on Optimism (chain 10): collateral stays in the borrower's EtherFiSafe and is counted from its balances (collateralOf → CashLens.getUserTotalCollateral, published source). Borrowers are ether.fi Cash card accounts only: an EtherFiSafe (smart-contract account) created by the EtherFiSafeFactory 0xF4e147Db314947fC1275a8CbB6Cde48c510cd8CF, whose deployEtherFiSafe() requires ETHERFI_SAFE_FACTORY_ADMIN_ROLE (published source), so ether.fi decides who gets an account. Two sampled Safes on Optimism (0xcA5582086c2759F5014ef069F2539F54063501D0, 0x7A70F3d69c09AE1D38FCeC60e8E048282139ee5a, factory index 545000-545001, read 2026-10-06 block 157847421): one user owner, threshold 1; recovery enabled, recovery threshold 2, recovery signers = the ether.fi Safe 0xA6cf33124cb342D1c604cAC87986B965F428AAC4 (3 of 6) and a third-party signer 0x4F5eB42edEce3285B97245f56b64598191b5A58E; EtherFiDataProvider.getRecoveryDelayPeriod() = 259200 s (72 h). ⚠ So ether.fi and the third party together can replace the Safe's owner after 72 h without the user (published RecoveryManager source: a recovery sets an incoming owner after the delay). The user can override the default recovery signers (setter in source); how many have done so is unknown. ether.fi's wallet role also debits the Safe for card spends (CashModule.spend, onlyEtherFiWallet) within the user's limits. ⚠ 'shared_key' is chosen because the user's key controls the Safe day to day, but ether.fi plus a third-party signer can replace that key after 72 h through recovery, and ether.fi can upgrade the Safe implementation (factory beacon; RoleRegistry owner = EtherFiTimelock 0x9106cD76E10Ac60D1dd16144243416EbD2C64434, getMinDelay 172800 s, read). (legacy value: shared_key) The venue-level value describes the main engine, which holds about 88% of the debt (32.45m USDC + 2.06m USDT + 418.80 WETH against the legacy 4.58m USDC) and into which positions move.
2. representation incomplete
   source

   wrapper_registry · wrapper_registry.yaml as of 2026-09-02
   deployment · chain 10 incomplete

   whether each token is issued natively on this chain or bridged to it — a further link when bridged — is not in wrapper_registry.yaml, which is keyed by symbol, not by chain or address
   • eBTC established · yield_bearing · identified by symbol
     EBTC established · issuer ether.fi · consortium

     ether.fi's receipt over bitcoin held through Lombard — resolves to Anchorage / Kraken Institutional.

     source

     issuer_doc

     inherits LBTC's sourcing

     LBTC established · issuer Lombard · consortium · holders [Anchorage Digital Bank, Kraken Institutional]

     WAS 'Lombard'. Lombard is the protocol. Its documentation places the BTC in Lombard-owned, segregated, bankruptcy-remote accounts at Anchorage Digital Bank, with the active allocation at Kraken Institutional and Anchorage; Bitwise holds trading authority only. Mint, burn and bridge require majority consensus of a 14-member Security Consortium. No public split between the two custodians, so the pair is carried whole.

     source

     issuer_doc

     docs.lombard.finance/use/lbtc; anchorage.com 'Lombard Builds LBTC's Institutional Structure on Anchorage Digital'

How this venue compares depends on what you'd borrow, for how long, against what. That's a question for your AI, with this data behind it.