HyperLend Pooled (Hyperliquid L1)
Takes as collateral: bitcoin and ether
Dollar loans only: other currencies are separate books, never added in
Debt and rates count loans made in US dollars and dollar stablecoins. Loans in euros, francs, yen, ether or bitcoin itself are separate books, shown by currency on each venue, never added in.
- BTC collateral — the supplied amount of the venue's pegged-bitcoin reserves as each pool reports it — what is deposited, not what is pledged against a loan.
- Dollar debt against bitcoin — bitcoin-only borrowers only: $11m more is owed in dollars by 509 accounts posting bitcoin among other collateral, a bound never apportioned.
- Aggregate LTV — the bitcoin-only borrowers' LTV, not the pool's: accounts posting bitcoin among other collateral are not in it.
- Liquidates at — the bitcoin-only borrowers only (accounts posting other collateral are not in it); $86,833 of their debt sits in positions that liquidate within a 20% fall.
What “Liquidates at” is: one price for the whole book, not a forecast
"Liquidates at" is the bitcoin price at which this book, taken as one position, stops covering its debt at its liquidation thresholds — an aggregate, not a forecast: individual loans are levered differently and liquidate above it.
Loan duration is not a venue figure on an on-chain pool: these markets are open-term, and a position runs until it is repaid or liquidated. A fixed term exists only where the venue writes one — the custodial desks (cefi_credit_rates.term_days) and Gavel's auction, which is fixed-rate and fixed-term by construction.
10 of 10 criteria researched. What the criteria are →
Markets — as served, not a venue rate
One row per market, as the venue publishes them. These are market rates: combining them into a single venue rate is a weighting across this venue's markets, and choosing one here would be a methodology decision taken in a web page.
No BTC market rows are served for this venue. It runs contracts, so the absence is this dataset’s, not the venue’s.
Price
What does credit cost here, and how is the price formed?
| Rate formation | algorithmic_utilisationsourceHyperLend on Hyperliquid (chain 999) — an Aave v3 interest rate strategy per reserve, a two-slope function of utilisation with a kink at the optimal ratio: algorithmic_utilisation. |
|---|---|
| Term structure | open_endedsourceHyperLend Pool 0x00A89d7a5A02160f20150EbEA7a2b5E4879A1A8b on Hyperliquid (chain 999) — borrow()/repay() carry no maturity; a position persists until repaid or liquidated. |
| Rate certainty | variablesourceHyperLend Pool 0x00A89d7a5A02160f20150EbEA7a2b5E4879A1A8b on Hyperliquid (chain 999) — the variable rate is recomputed from utilisation on every ReserveDataUpdated; nothing is fixed at origination. |
Quality
What stands behind a position, and what can change under the reader?
| Oracle dependency | multiplesourceHyperLend PoolAddressesProvider 0x72c98246a98bFe64022a3190e7710E157497170C on Hyperliquid (chain 999) → getPriceOracle() = 0xC9Fb4fbE842d57EAc1dF3e641a281827493A630e (read 2026-09-30; getMarketId() "HyperLend Market"). An Aave-v3 oracle holds one source per asset across every reserve, plus a fallback, and governance can replace any of them. A pooled venue's solvency depends on all of the feeds backing the reserves an account touches, not on one. |
|---|---|
| Default & liquidation | thresholdsourceHyperLend Pool 0x00A89d7a5A02160f20150EbEA7a2b5E4879A1A8b on Hyperliquid (chain 999), an Aave v3 deployment — liquidationCall() is permitted once an account's health factor falls below 1e18, computed from per-reserve liquidation thresholds (or the eMode category's) across the account's whole collateral basket. |
| Custody & backing | protocol_custodialsourceHyperLend Pool 0x00A89d7a5A02160f20150EbEA7a2b5E4879A1A8b on Hyperliquid (chain 999) — supply() transfers the underlying to the reserve's aToken contract under the Pool's control; the depositor holds an aToken claim rather than the asset. |
| Recourse | non_recoursesourceHyperLend Pool 0x00A89d7a5A02160f20150EbEA7a2b5E4879A1A8b on Hyperliquid (chain 999) — liability is bounded by the account's collateral: liquidationCall() seizes collateral and no function pursues a borrower beyond it. (Aave v3.3's DeficitCreated is not cited: this estate has not observed it on this venue.) |
| Track record | 13 months observedsourceDerived from the first aggregator observation this dataset holds for the venue (defi_rates_llama, 2025-08-26; the registry holds no first_date for it). This is a LOWER BOUND on the venue's age, not the age itself: a venue trading long before the aggregator began listing it reads short here. The observer is the aggregator, not the venue's own contracts. Not typed, and not a claim about the venue's longevity. |
Composition
Who and what makes up this market?
| Collateral accepted | BTC reserves (1): UBTCsourcePool.getReservesList() on Hyperliquid (chain 999), HyperLend Pool 0x00A89d7a5A02160f20150EbEA7a2b5E4879A1A8b, read 2026-09-30 (registry/resolution/2026-09/aave_forks.json; root: docs.hyperlend.finance/developer-documentation/contract-addresses (core pool)): 18 reserves (WHYPE, wstHYPE, UBTC, UETH, USDe, USD₮0, sUSDe, USDHL, kHYPE, USR, PT-kHYPE-13NOV2025, PT-sUSDE-25SEP2025, USOL, beHYPE, USDC, USDH, PT-kHYPE-19MAR2026, PT-kHYPE-24SEP2026). Bitcoin: UBTC 0x9FDBdA0A5e284c32744D2f17Ee5c74B284993463 ("Unit Bitcoin", 8 decimals) — 146 supplied, base LTV 59%, liquidation threshold 65.5%, borrowable. NOTE: the pool is multi-collateral, so a BTC reserve's presence does not mean a given borrow is secured by it. |
|---|---|
| Book depth & concentration | unknown (no per-venue counterparty count exists in this registry or in the comparison payload, so depth and concentration cannot be established. This is a gap in THIS DATASET, not in the venue, and is a different value from `undisclosed`, which would mean the venue does not publish it.) |
| Observability | price: partial — Observed through the aggregator (DefiLlama). The aggregator's rows are each pool's published borrow and supply rates as it reports them — not a read of the venue's own contracts, and not checked against one. As of 2026-10-01. quantity: partial — Observed through the aggregator (DefiLlama): bitcoin collateral is the supplied amount of each pegged-bitcoin reserve, converted at the day's bitcoin reference, and debt is the borrowed amount per pool or vault. Neither is a read of the venue's own contracts. As of 2026-10-01. composition: none — Not obtainable from an aggregator — composition is loan-level and requires event ingestion, which is not planned for this venue. |
What the loans are denominated in
| Borrowed in | Assets | Size (USD equivalent) | In the loan asset | Read by |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US dollars | $1.4m | — | account-by-account pool read, 2026-10-13 | |
| not dollars — currency not yet split | $66k | — | account-by-account pool read, 2026-10-13 |
Each currency is a separate book; the dollar equivalents compare sizes and are never added together.
Backing chain
Each link from what this venue takes as collateral down to the bitcoin it rests on, in order, with how each link was established.
How a chain is read, and what it does not claim
backing_chain: the ordered claims standing between a creditor and the coins, each link derived from a sourced fact already held and carrying it in `derived_from` — the custody cell, the venue's borrow card, or wrapper_registry.yaml for who holds the bitcoin behind a token. A `representation` link has one branch per token the venue takes; branches are alternatives, not a sequence. A link nobody has established is shown with status `incomplete` and names what is missing — it is never dropped, because a missing link omitted makes a long chain look short. `undisclosed` means the party does not publish it; `incomplete` means this dataset has not established it. NEVER SCORED AND NEVER COUNTED: no length, link count or ranking is published, and none should be derived — chain length and link transparency are orthogonal (ETP-backed margin is the longest chain here and every link of it is regulated). `recourse` is what the creditor holds beyond the chain. ⚠ Tokens are identified BY SYMBOL: the wrapper registry is not keyed by chain or address, so every `representation` link carries a `deployment` step that is incomplete — whether a token is native to the chain of the venue or a bridge receipt (one more link) is not established — and a symbol the registry knows to name a different token on a venue is shown unresolved, not given that wrapper's holders.
- contract_escrow established — the protocol contract — the collateral is escrowed and neither the operator nor the borrower can move it
source
attribute · custody_model = protocol_custodialHyperLend Pool 0x00A89d7a5A02160f20150EbEA7a2b5E4879A1A8b on Hyperliquid (chain 999) — supply() transfers the underlying to the reserve's aToken contract under the Pool's control; the depositor holds an aToken claim rather than the asset. - representation incomplete
source
wrapper_registry · wrapper_registry.yaml as of 2026-09-02deployment · chain 999 incompletewhether each token is issued natively on this chain or bridged to it — a further link when bridged — is not in wrapper_registry.yaml, which is keyed by symbol, not by chain or address- UBTC established · direct_wrapped · identified by symbolUBTC established · issuer Unit · consortium · holders [Unit, Hyperliquid, Infinite Field]Held by a 2-of-3 MPC threshold signature among three named Guardians — Unit, Hyperliquid and Infinite Field — each holding a key share in a secure enclave. Classed consortium, as FBTC is: the coins move when two NAMED institutions sign, which is who could fail; tBTC's threshold-signature class is reserved for an anonymous rotating group.
source
issuer_docdocs.hyperunit.xyz/architecture/security ('a 2-of-3 MPC threshold signature scheme (TSS), requiring a majority of Guardians to sign'); docs.hyperunit.xyz/architecture/components ('Initial Guardian Network Participants': Unit, Hyperliquid, Infinite Field)
- UBTC established · direct_wrapped · identified by symbol
source
The generic axis set
Identical for every venue, identically computed. An axis that cannot be computed here renders its reason — never silently omitted, because an omitted axis says it was not considered. A figure that covers only part of what the axis asks is marked, with what it leaves out beneath it. Collateral, debt and the borrow and lend rates are the tiles at the top of this page.
| Utilisation (venue roll-up) | 89.9% the pool's dollar reserves: borrowed over supplied across 3 reserve(s), latest day — the whole pool, not its bitcoin book defi_rates_llama, quantity-gated |
|---|---|
| Intermediation margin | +1.59 pts · derived the pool's borrow rate minus its supply rate on the same dollar reserves — what the venue keeps, plus the cost of idle supply borrow rate minus lend rate, both as above |
| Trailing realised average (7/30/90d) | 7d 6.45% · 30d 6.09% · 90d 7.84% dollar loans, debt-weighted over the days observed (7 / 30 / 90 of 7 / 30 / 90); continuously compounded defi_rates_llama — the 30-day window's rows, gates and floor (098) |
| Rate volatility (30/90d) | 30d 1.14 pts · 90d 2.14 pts the standard deviation of the daily debt-weighted borrow rate, in percentage points — not annualised the daily rate above |
| Spread to the pair aggregate | +1.19 pts vs Algorithmic · derived this venue's borrow rate minus its class's (4.90%), both as served on the spine /v1/market/tree — the venue's and its class's borrow rates |
| Spread to matched Treasuries | +1.95 pts vs the 1-month bill (4.13%) · derived the venue's borrow rate minus the 1-month bill, both continuously compounded. An open-term loan has no maturity of its own, so the bill stands for a 30-day window macro_rates — the 1-month Treasury bill, 2026-10-08 (Federal Reserve H.15) |
| Origination flow | collecting (not read yet) — loan events are read for Morpho Blue (Ethereum, Base) and the six Aave v3 chains only |
| Repayment flow | collecting (not read yet) — loan events are read for Morpho Blue (Ethereum, Base) and the six Aave v3 chains only |
| Aggregate and distributional LTV | 25.1% · 5.8% of the bitcoin-only debt liquidates within a 20% fall · partial the bitcoin-only borrowers' LTV, not the pool's: accounts posting bitcoin among other collateral are not in it contract_read — the pool's own contracts, account by account |
| Residence distribution | collecting (not read yet) — how long positions stay open needs each loan's history; it is held for Morpho Blue and the Aave v3 chains and not yet computed |
| Liquidation incidence | 0 bitcoin-only position(s) past their threshold now ($0) · partial positions the venue would liquidate now and has not the pool read (157) |
| Top-10 concentration share | top 10 hold 89.8% of the bitcoin-only debt (largest 62.1%), 91 accounts · partial the bitcoin-only borrowers, not every borrower at the venue the pool read, account by account (155) |
There is no score on this page and none will be added. The criteria are published and versioned before any venue is measured against them, and this venue's row is produced by the same pipeline as every other.
Access routes
Unknown (not surveyed yet). No one has looked for an MCP server for this venue. That is not the same as having looked and found none, and this row will not say the second while meaning the first. The listing criteria are published.
Ask for this by machine
| REST | GET https://api.bitcoincreditstack.com/v1/market/venues/hyperlend_pooled_hyperliquid_l1 |
|---|---|
| MCP | get_venue({ venue_id: "hyperlend_pooled_hyperliquid_l1" }) get_venue({ venue_id: "hyperlend_pooled_hyperliquid_l1", include: ["axes", "headline"] }) |
The same figures, the same names and dates. Connect your AI →
How this venue compares depends on what you'd borrow, for how long, against what. That's a question for your AI, with this data behind it.
https://mcp.bitcoincreditstack.com/mcp