The Bitcoin Credit Stack
rates are percent a year, continuously compounded · figures as of 2026-10-13 · read 2026-10-13 14:43 UTC
Market › Algorithmic › Moonwell Lending › Moonbeam

Moonwell Lending (Moonbeam)

Takes as collateral: bitcoin and ether

moonwell_lending_moonbeam · on-chain pool · ingesting

One of 2 deployments of Moonwell Lending · also on Base

Secured by
BTC collateral
0.5876 BTC
partial
0.5% of Moonwell Lending
<0.1% of the market
Dollar debt against bitcoin
unknown (below the research floor)
Aggregate LTV
unknown (below the research floor)
Borrow rate (USD loans)
unknown (below the research floor)
Lend rate (USD loans)
unknown (below the research floor)
Liquidates at
unknown (below the research floor)
Dollar loans only: other currencies are separate books, never added in

Debt and rates count loans made in US dollars and dollar stablecoins. Loans in euros, francs, yen, ether or bitcoin itself are separate books, shown by currency on each venue, never added in.

  • BTC collateral — the supplied amount of the venue's pegged-bitcoin reserves as each pool reports it — what is deposited, not what is pledged against a loan.
BTC collateral of Moonwell Lending — Moonwell Lending (Moonbeam) 0.5%
Dollar debt against bitcoin of Algorithmic — Moonwell Lending <0.1%, <0.1% of its bitcoin collateral
Dollar debt against bitcoin of the market — Algorithmic 13%, 14% of its bitcoin collateral

Loan duration is not a venue figure on an on-chain pool: these markets are open-term, and a position runs until it is repaid or liquidated. A fixed term exists only where the venue writes one — the custodial desks (cefi_credit_rates.term_days) and Gavel's auction, which is fixed-rate and fixed-term by construction.

10 of 10 criteria researched. What the criteria are →

Listed, not researched in full. This venue is read only through an aggregator, and its 30-day book peaked at $0 over the last 90 days, under the $5m research floor. Its rate and book are published as for any venue; its criteria are not researched. What the floor is →

Markets — as served, not a venue rate

One row per market, as the venue publishes them. These are market rates: combining them into a single venue rate is a weighting across this venue's markets, and choosing one here would be a methodology decision taken in a web page.

No BTC market rows are served for this venue. It runs contracts, so the absence is this dataset’s, not the venue’s.

Price

What does credit cost here, and how is the price formed?

Rate formationalgorithmic_utilisation
source
Moonwell on Moonbeam (chain 1284) — each mToken names an interestRateModel() evaluated on cash, borrows and reserves: a function of utilisation, algorithmic_utilisation. The curve each model implements was not read.
Term structureopen_ended
source
Moonwell mToken markets on Moonbeam (chain 1284) — borrow()/repayBorrow() carry no maturity; a position persists until repaid or liquidated.
Rate certaintyvariable
source
Moonwell mToken markets on Moonbeam (chain 1284) — each market accrues at the rate its interestRateModel() returns for the market's current cash, borrows and reserves; nothing is fixed at origination.

Quality

What stands behind a position, and what can change under the reader?

Oracle dependencymultiple
source
Moonwell Comptroller 0x8E00D5e02E65A19337Cdba98bbA9F84d4186a180 on Moonbeam (chain 1284) → oracle() = 0xED301cd3EB27217BDB05C4E9B820a8A3c8B665f9 (read 2026-09-30). One oracle contract prices every market, from a source per asset that governance can replace. A pooled venue's solvency depends on the feeds of every market an account has entered, not on one.
Default & liquidationthreshold
source
Moonwell Comptroller 0x8E00D5e02E65A19337Cdba98bbA9F84d4186a180 on Moonbeam (chain 1284) — an account can be liquidated once its borrow exceeds the sum of its collateral at each market's collateral factor (markets(token).collateralFactorMantissa); a liquidator repays up to the close factor (50%) of a borrow and seizes mToken collateral.
Custody & backingprotocol_custodial
source
Moonwell mToken markets on Moonbeam (chain 1284) — mint() transfers the underlying to the market's own contract; the depositor holds the mToken as a claim rather than the asset.
Recoursenon_recourse
source
Moonwell Comptroller 0x8E00D5e02E65A19337Cdba98bbA9F84d4186a180 on Moonbeam (chain 1284) — liability is bounded by the collateral a liquidator can seize; no function pursues a borrower beyond it, and a shortfall stays in the market as bad debt.
Track record46 months observed
source
Derived from the first aggregator observation this dataset holds for the venue (defi_rates_llama, 2022-11-29; the registry holds no first_date for it). This is a LOWER BOUND on the venue's age, not the age itself: a venue trading long before the aggregator began listing it reads short here. The observer is the aggregator, not the venue's own contracts. Not typed, and not a claim about the venue's longevity.

Composition

Who and what makes up this market?

Collateral acceptedBTC markets (0) at a usable collateral factor
source
Moonwell Comptroller 0x8E00D5e02E65A19337Cdba98bbA9F84d4186a180 on Moonbeam (chain 1284) — getAllMarkets() and markets(token) (registry/resolution/2026-09/comptroller_forks.json; root github.com/moonwell-fi/moonwell-contracts-v2 chains/1284.json). 12 markets (mGLMR, mDOT, mETH, mWBTC, mUSDC, mFRAX, mETH.wh, mWBTC.wh, mUSDC.wh, mBUSD.wh, mxcUSDT, mxcUSDC), read 2026-09-30. No bitcoin market carries a collateral factor of 10% or more. Listed with a collateral factor under 10% (being wound down; it backs almost no borrowing): mWBTC 0x24A9d8f1f350d59cB0368D3d52A77dB29c833D1D over WBTC 0x1DC78Acda13a8BC4408B207c9E48CDBc096D95e0 (8 decimals) — collateral factor 0%, 0.00577 supplied, 0.00565 borrowed; mWBTC.wh 0xaaa20c5a584a9fECdFEDD71E46DA7858B774A9ce over WBTC 0xE57eBd2d67B462E9926e04a8e33f01cD0D64346D (8 decimals) — collateral factor 6%, 0.619 supplied, 0.00396 borrowed. NOTE: the pool is multi-collateral, so a market's presence does not mean a given borrow is secured by it.
Book depth & concentrationunknown (no per-venue counterparty count exists in this registry or in the comparison payload, so depth and concentration cannot be established. This is a gap in THIS DATASET, not in the venue, and is a different value from `undisclosed`, which would mean the venue does not publish it.)
Observability
price: partial — Observed through the aggregator (DefiLlama). The aggregator's rows are each pool's published borrow and supply rates as it reports them — not a read of the venue's own contracts, and not checked against one. As of 2026-10-01.
quantity: partial — Observed through the aggregator (DefiLlama): bitcoin collateral is the supplied amount of each pegged-bitcoin reserve, converted at the day's bitcoin reference, and debt is the borrowed amount per pool or vault. Neither is a read of the venue's own contracts. As of 2026-10-01.
composition: none — Not obtainable from an aggregator — composition is loan-level and requires event ingestion, which is not planned for this venue.

What the loans are denominated in

Not yet established for this venue — which is not the same as dollars.

Backing chain

Each link from what this venue takes as collateral down to the bitcoin it rests on, in order, with how each link was established.

How a chain is read, and what it does not claim

backing_chain: the ordered claims standing between a creditor and the coins, each link derived from a sourced fact already held and carrying it in `derived_from` — the custody cell, the venue's borrow card, or wrapper_registry.yaml for who holds the bitcoin behind a token. A `representation` link has one branch per token the venue takes; branches are alternatives, not a sequence. A link nobody has established is shown with status `incomplete` and names what is missing — it is never dropped, because a missing link omitted makes a long chain look short. `undisclosed` means the party does not publish it; `incomplete` means this dataset has not established it. NEVER SCORED AND NEVER COUNTED: no length, link count or ranking is published, and none should be derived — chain length and link transparency are orthogonal (ETP-backed margin is the longest chain here and every link of it is regulated). `recourse` is what the creditor holds beyond the chain. ⚠ Tokens are identified BY SYMBOL: the wrapper registry is not keyed by chain or address, so every `representation` link carries a `deployment` step that is incomplete — whether a token is native to the chain of the venue or a bridge receipt (one more link) is not established — and a symbol the registry knows to name a different token on a venue is shown unresolved, not given that wrapper's holders.

  1. contract_escrow established — the protocol contract — the collateral is escrowed and neither the operator nor the borrower can move it
    source
    attribute · custody_model = protocol_custodial
    Moonwell mToken markets on Moonbeam (chain 1284) — mint() transfers the underlying to the market's own contract; the depositor holds the mToken as a claim rather than the asset.
  2. representation incomplete
    source
    wrapper_registry · wrapper_registry.yaml as of 2026-09-02
    deployment · chain 1284 incomplete
    whether each token is issued natively on this chain or bridged to it — a further link when bridged — is not in wrapper_registry.yaml, which is keyed by symbol, not by chain or address
    • WBTC established · direct_wrapped · identified by symbol
      WBTC established · issuer BitGo · custodial · holders [BitGo]
      Reserves in 2-of-3 multisig with BitGo holding two keys. Since 2024 BitGo custodies jointly with BiT Global, a Hong Kong custodian part-owned by Justin Sun — a second name on the same bitcoin, recorded but not split because no share is published.
      source
      issuer_doc
      BitGo, 'Wrapped BTC Launches with BitGo Custody and Full Proof of Assets', blog.bitgo.com; proof-of-reserve at wbtc.network
Recourse: non_recourse
source
attribute · recourse
Moonwell Comptroller 0x8E00D5e02E65A19337Cdba98bbA9F84d4186a180 on Moonbeam (chain 1284) — liability is bounded by the collateral a liquidator can seize; no function pursues a borrower beyond it, and a shortfall stays in the market as bad debt.

The generic axis set

Identical for every venue, identically computed. An axis that cannot be computed here renders its reason — never silently omitted, because an omitted axis says it was not considered. A figure that covers only part of what the axis asks is marked, with what it leaves out beneath it. Collateral, debt and the borrow and lend rates are the tiles at the top of this page.

Utilisation (venue roll-up)9.1%
the pool's dollar reserves: borrowed over supplied across 2 reserve(s), latest day — the whole pool, not its bitcoin book
defi_rates_llama, quantity-gated
Intermediation marginunknown (below the research floor) — needs both a borrow and a lend rate; the borrow rate is not served here
Trailing realised average (7/30/90d)collecting (not read yet) — no dollar loan at this venue cleared the gates and the $250k floor in the last 90 days
Rate volatility (30/90d)collecting (not read yet) — no dollar loan at this venue cleared the gates and the $250k floor in the last 90 days
Spread to the pair aggregateunknown (below the research floor) — this venue has no borrow rate to compare
Spread to matched Treasuriesunknown (below the research floor) — this venue has no borrow rate to compare
Origination flowcollecting (not read yet) — loan events are read for Morpho Blue (Ethereum, Base) and the six Aave v3 chains only
Repayment flowcollecting (not read yet) — loan events are read for Morpho Blue (Ethereum, Base) and the six Aave v3 chains only
Aggregate and distributional LTVunknown (below the research floor) — a pool's debt has no collateral of its own; the LTV of its bitcoin-only borrowers needs an account-level read, which this venue does not have yet. This venue is below the research floor — its book has not reached $5m on any day of the last 90 — so it is not researched
Residence distributioncollecting (not read yet) — how long positions stay open needs each loan's history; it is held for Morpho Blue and the Aave v3 chains and not yet computed
Liquidation incidencecollecting (not read yet) — liquidations are read from events for Morpho Blue and the Aave v3 chains, and as positions past threshold where a pool is read account by account
Top-10 concentration sharecollecting (not read yet) — borrower concentration is read where a pool is read account by account (21 venues)

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (H.15, H.4.1, H.6).

There is no score on this page and none will be added. The criteria are published and versioned before any venue is measured against them, and this venue's row is produced by the same pipeline as every other.

Access routes

Unknown (not surveyed yet). No one has looked for an MCP server for this venue. That is not the same as having looked and found none, and this row will not say the second while meaning the first. The listing criteria are published.

Ask for this by machine

REST
GET https://api.bitcoincreditstack.com/v1/market/venues/moonwell_lending_moonbeam
MCP
get_venue({ venue_id: "moonwell_lending_moonbeam" })
get_venue({ venue_id: "moonwell_lending_moonbeam", include: ["axes", "headline"] })

The same figures, the same names and dates. Connect your AI →

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Orientation · Moonwell Lending (Moonbeam)Holder · Moonwell Lending (Moonbeam)Treasurer · Moonwell Lending (Moonbeam)Analyst · Moonwell Lending (Moonbeam)Risk · Moonwell Lending (Moonbeam)
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